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 The paper is a further developed and specified version of Salverda, 1998c.
2,QWURGXFWLRQ
In a speech on the ‘:DURI WKHPRGHOV:KLFK ODERXUPDUNHW LQVWLWXWLRQV IRU WKH
VWFHQWXU\"’, Richard Freeman (1998, 2) called the Netherlands “the only part-
time economy in the world, the new champion of the Continent, with a finger in
the dike of unemployment”. Indeed, a quick look at the figures appears to confirm
this. Wherever one looks – at employees or the self-employed, at male or female
workers, at manufacturing or services – the Dutch rate of part-time work is very
high by international standards and the average working week is rather low. The
incidence of part-time work is considerably more than twice the European average
(Table 1, see also Table A.1 for more details). The incidence of flexible work is
more difficult to compare internationally. If defined as temporary work, the Dutch
situation differs little from the European, although Dutch women have a relatively
high incidence. These facts would not attract so much attention if at the same time
the rate of unemployment had not been so favourably low compared to other
countries, coming down from a peak in the 1980s that was higher than in most
other countries (Figure 1)2. In 1998, the standardised Dutch rate of unemployment
(4.0%) was even below the American (4.5%) and was significantly less than half
the European (10.0) level. The fact that this has been realised in an entirely
different way from the USA – corporatism works?! – adds a very attractive flavour
for many observers. Earnings inequality increased significantly in America but in
the Netherlands it remained low and virtually unchanged while the incidence of
low-paid employment is also still very modest (Table 2). German inequality is at a
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 OECD figures, not corrected for breaks in the series. After an estimated correction, the
Dutch Central Planning Bureau (1998) assumes a much more modest decrease in
unemployment than shown here, from a maximum of 9.7 % in 1984 to 5.3 in 1997.
3comparable level and French inequality also changed very little but it is
significantly higher than in the Netherlands. British inequality, however, increased
substantially – more than American – and the incidence of low pay is also high.
Each of these elements, part-time jobs, low unemployment, or low
inequality, are found in other countries. Their successful combination, however,
seems unique and makes up the ‘Dutch miracle’. This strongly contrasts with the
previous situation of the 1980s that was perceived as the ‘Dutch disease’. The
wonder seems to imply a significant redistribution of employment with a lowering
effect on the level of unemployment. In spite of the literal sense of the word
miracle as something unexplained coming out of the blue, it is thought to be the
more or less deliberate result of a ‘model’. In a nutshell, the basic idea is that
conscious efforts of government and the so-called social partners, focussed on
large and lasting wage moderation, have resulted in a better employment
performance than in most other countries, particularly neighbouring countries in
Europe.
** Tables 1 and 2, Figure 1 **
By definition, miracles come out of the blue and do not result from
conscious action and therefore should systematically be demystified to enable a
proper consideration. To see if there are any lessons to be learnt for other
countries, but equally for the future of the Dutch economy, three questions should
be posed. First, is should be asked whether the Dutch labour market has indeed
been transformed. Is it really so successful regarding employment growth as many
think? The evolution of the Dutch labour market over the last two decades will be
pictured to find out about this transformation. It will also be examined how this
fits Dutch HFRQRPLF performance over the 1980s and 1990s.The second question is
                                                                                                                                      
However, I think this correction underestimates the increase of the early 1980s (cf.
Salverda, 1992, Appendix A).
whether such a transformation has been the deliberate result of policies. Does it
relate to a special model of policymaking and/or specific actions undertaken by the
actors of the model? Thereto, we discuss the ‘model’ in some detail, and consider
the most important policies and their connection, if any, to the ‘model’. The third
question is to know whether such policies may be successfully copied in other
countries or sustained in the future. Could the particular policies generate the same
effects in other countries or would their success depend on also reproducing the
wider context of decision-making? Or do the effects perhaps rest on the particular
configuration of the Dutch economy or its change? Both options can make
imitation or continuation difficult or forthright impossible. Some observations will
be made regarding these issues by way of conclusion to the paper.
These questions naturally raise other questions in turn, but it is far outside
the scope of this contribution to give a full description and evaluation of the Dutch
economy over the last decades. The focus is how the outcomes relate to conscious
actions following indeed from the Dutch model. The query is not to fully dissect
the Dutch model and see neither whether it necessarily generates such policies nor
whether other models could have generated the same results.
Before starting, it should be stressed that although the ‘miracle’ is a much
debated issue in the Netherlands there are no clear, generally accepted answers to
these questions – if they are asked at all, given the national euphoria about the
situation, particularly in political circles. In that sense, the miracle is equally a
riddle. The present argument intends to make a critical contribution to the debate.
Two issues should be stressed. First, the starting point for singing the praise of the
Dutch model is often chosen around 1983 or 1984. In those years, however, the
Netherlands hit the lowest level of the deep economic decline that was triggered by
the ‘second oil crisis’. Instead, I take my starting point before the crisis, in 1979,
5when the economic cycle was better comparable to the present situation3. Starting
the comparison in 1983 or 1984 is also pre-emptying the discussion about the
contributions of the Dutch model during the years preceding 1982. The latter year
is frequently considered as the pivotal year because of the :DVVHQDDU$JUHHPHQW,
concluded between unions and employers4. Note, however, that the country had
exactly the same institutions before this. Second, I will draw the comparison to
other countries as much as possible on a per capita basis. This serves to correct for
the faster population growth in the Netherlands5 – actually, it was two times (11%)
as fast as the EU average (5.5%) over the last two decades. Finally, the argument
will generally focus on GHSHQGHQW employment and JURVV wages, for various
reasons, such as the availability of data, the significant international differences in
the employment share of the self-employed6 and, last not least, the role of policies,
particularly wage moderation which does not affect the self-employed.
7UDQVIRUPDWLRQV
The Dutch labour market has witnessed a strong growth of employment and a
simultaneous increase in the incidence of part-time and flexible jobs while the
number of full-time jobs fell slightly, with some cyclical variation (Figure 2). The
three categories are defined depending on the person’s labour contract. Full-time
and part-time jobs concern workers with a permanent appointment (or a temporary
contract with the legal promise of a permanent position) while flexible jobs are an
altogether different category. They can either be of limited duration or have an
indeterminate number of working hours and, therefore, they can be either part-time
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 Cf. Gorter and Poot, 1998, for a similar argument and an interesting comparison between
the Dutch model and New Zealand.
4
 Named after the place where it was concluded.
5
 Krueger and Pischke, 1997, 6, discuss the importance of population growth for labour
demand suggesting that it comes close to Say’s Law.
6
 In the European Union, ranging from 29 % in Italy to 9 % in Denmark.
or full-time in the sense of the number of hours worked per week. Naturally, part-
time jobs may also be an important form of flexibility with a stimulating effect on
productivity. They enable hiring labour at regular peak hours of demand,
especially in services such as the retail trade or public transport.
Between 1979 and 1997 Dutch employment as a whole grew by 28 per
cent, and particularly after 1983 its growth equalled the American employment
miracle. On balance, all Dutch growth resided in part-time and flexible jobs, in a
ratio of three to one. The former doubled in numbers, the latter increased by 150 per
cent. Notably, the decline in employment of the early 1980s affected only full-time
jobs (-9%). The growth in part-time and flexible employment is an ongoing
process that already made itself felt in the 1970s. It did not step up its pace until
after the mid-1980s. Part-time jobs showed an average annual growth of 4 % with
little variation and only a slight acceleration after the mid-eighties. Initially,
flexible jobs grew at a similar pace but since 1989 this has rapidly accelerated,
with a relatively large cyclical fluctuation around 1993. Particularly in recent
years, full-time jobs suffered a new decline (-5%) while part-time and flexible
employment more than compensated for this.
It is important to note that among part-time jobs the very small jobs, of less
than 10 or 12 hours a week, are a highly significant phenomenon, and were so over
the entire period7. In the Netherlands, their incidence is very high by international
standards (Table 18). Leaving them out lowers the incidence of part-time jobs
considerably, and also brings down the Dutch employees-to-population ratio from
68 to 61 per cent, a level close to that of various other European countries.
Average hourly pay for part-time jobs was 86 per cent of full-time pay in 1995. The
actual differential is much smaller (an estimated 6 per cent below full-time pay) if we
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 The Dutch LFS documents jobs of less than 12 hours per week but leaves them out in the
standard definition of the labour force. Including the self-employed their incidence was
9.5% in 1981 and still was 9 % in 1997 (private communication by CBS). Their share in
hours worked is an estimated 2 to 2.5 %.
8
 Eurostat definitions for full-time and part-time jobs include flexible jobs as they depend on
hours worked and not on the contractual relationship.
7account for personal and job characteristics such as the concentration of these jobs in
young age groups and in low-paying industries like the retail trade9. In spite of the
very high incidence of part-time work in the Dutch economy, employees often seem
satisfied not to have a full-time job. Working part-time appears to conform to their
tastes. In 1996 only 2.4 per cent of the total Dutch labour force (or 6 % of part-time
workers) would have preferred a full-time job over their part-time employment
against 3.1 per cent for the European Union as a whole (or 19 % of EU part-time
employees)10. Naturally, the satisfaction mirrors the fact that often the earnings from
a part-time job are the second income in a household, usually generated by the
female partner. Evidently, this should not be taken to imply that these jobs allow
economic independence. By contrast, average pay for IOH[LEOH jobs is considerably
below full-time earnings (57 %). Although, again, part of the pay gap may be
explained by a high concentration among youth, flexible jobs do in fact have little
quality in providing economic independence. Much of it is temporary work that is
paid the statutory (youth) minimum wage. Their growing incidence therefore points
to a qualitative deterioration of employment if viewed from the employee side,
particularly for youths11.
** Figure 2 **
(PSOR\PHQW
The growing significance of part-time work, combined with the general reduction
in working hours12, has important implications for the evolution of the employment
volume, both in a time perspective within the Netherlands and in comparison to
other countries. Usually, the measurement of employment is a headcount of the
number of SHUVRQVhaving work. This is not without importance, particularly for the
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 Cf. Salverda, 1998b, for a further analysis of differentials.
10
 Eurostat, /DERXU)RUFH6XUYH\5HVXOWV, Table 059.
11
 Cf. Salverda & Schonewille, 1998.
12
 Annual IXOOWLPH hours fell by 6 % between 1979 and 1997.
participation of the labour force, but for an evaluation of the economics of the labour
market a volume-count of the number of KRXUV annually worked seems more to the
point. Figure 3 shows how substantial the gap is between the headcount and the
hours-count. Between 1979 and 1997, the former showed an increase by 28 per cent,
the latter by only 9. The part-time share in hours worked went up from 9 to 19 per
cent (in the headcount from 18 to 30 %) and the flexible share rose from 3 to 7 per
cent (instead of 6 to 12). Obviously, the full-time share fell, from 88 to 74 per cent of
all hours worked. Taken per capita, the employment volume initially fell
considerably (1979-1984: -10%) and made only limited progress during the rest of
the period. Consequently, its present level still remains below that of 1979. For the
sake of comparison the graph also shows the evolution of US employment
(headcount). In the US, hours worked per person tended to increase so the hours-
count would be even more favourable.
** Figure 3 **
Now, how does Dutch volume growth compare internationally? OECD figures13 on
annual hours worked enable only a limited and approximate comparison of the
changes over time. On balance, Dutch per capita employment growth appears to be
similar or only slightly better than in neighbouring countries like the UK and
Germany (Figure 4). It was considerably better than in France, but startlingly worse
than in the US14. Evidently, the usual headcount of employment is greatly flattering
for the Netherlands compared to the volume-count.
** Figure 4 **
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 Cf. OECD, (PSOR\PHQW2XWORRN p. 207.
14
 Norway and Sweden were similar to the Netherlands, Finland did worse than France.
98QHPSOR\PHQW
Three remarks about unemployment may complement these observations on
employment. First, the usual international comparisons as made by the OECD and
the ILO relate the number of unemployed to the full headcount labour force. By
contrast, if we would leave aside the very small jobs mentioned earlier15, the Dutch
rate of unemployment rises from 5.5 to 6.1 percent in 1997 while the European rate
increases relatively little (10.8→11.1). Also, the definition of the unemployed as
persons willing and able to work on the condition that they have been actively looked
for work over the last four weeks before the survey tends to keep unemployment
figures down more strongly in the Netherlands than elsewhere. If, instead, we would
also count those inactive persons who say they are willing and able to work, the
Dutch unemployment rate would increase to 12.3 per cent and the European average
to 15.716 (see Figure 5). As a result, the distance between the two falls from to less
than a quarter of the European level. Evidently, a larger proportion of those willing
to work can afford to engage less actively in job search – the official criterion for the
unemployment count – in the Netherlands than elsewhere17.
** Figure 5 **
Second, the decline in official unemployment has not equally benefited the
so-called vulnerable groups in the labour market, such as ethnic minorities and the
unskilled in comparison with the core group of prime-age males (Figure 6). These
categories consistently have unemployment rates three to five times higher than the
reference group, presented as concentration rates in the figure. Also, they tend to go
up relative to the reference rate when the latter goes down.
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 To do justice to the fact that most of the unemployed questioned by the LFS wish for a
substantial job.
16
 Including the active willing to work in both unemployment and labour force, disregarding
jobs of less than ten hours a week (Eurostat, LFS 1996).
17
 The frequent combination of education with a part-time job may help to explain this.
** Figure 6 **
Finally, the relatively low levels of Dutch youth unemployment18, which
naturally help to keep unemployment at a low level, do not rest on a solid growth of
youth employment. Instead, the Dutch economy appears to profit from a strong
demographic decline in the age group19 and a continuously increasing participation in
education (like in many other countries). Their prolonged stay in education is going
hand in hand with the increase in part-time and flexible work. At the end of the
1970s the incidence of part-time jobs in youth employment was significantly below
average, now it is far above. They particularly often have a very small part-time job.
One third of all employed youths work less than 12 hours a week; four times as often
as adults. Recently, they also witness a high and extremely rapidly increasing
incidence of flexible jobs. From 1992 to 1997, this grew spectacularly from a level of
16.5 to 27.5 per cent of all youths working 12 hours a week or more20.
(FRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFH
In addition to these labour market outcomes, we consider the economic results
obtained by the Netherlands over the period.
** Figure 7 **
Figure 7 concisely shows the evolution of the most important economic
variables, GDP, investment, private consumption, exports and imports. It pictures
Dutch outcomes, measured by volume indices, relative to the average of the
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 In 1997, 8.2, 19.1 and 10.4 % for the Netherlands, the European Union and the USA
respectively (OECD, (PSOR\PHQW2XWORRN, Table C).
19
 Cf. OECD (1999), 86.
20
 Over the same period, the adult male incidence of flexible jobs increased from 3.3 to 4.8 %
while the adult female incidence fluctuated between 10 and 11 per cent (head-count figures).
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European Union and the United States taken together21. Table A.2 presents more
details for the EU and the US separately, and for Belgium, Germany, the United
Kingdom and France.
The increase in the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) does not
look special. 1989 and 1990 were the only years of Dutch growth exceeding any of
the above countries. Something similar holds for exports, which is notable as the
Dutch wage moderation was primarily meant to improve the international
competitive position. By lowering wages compared to other countries, a country
may attempt to improve its competitiveness and attract more product demand at the
expense of the others. Thus unemployment would be exported, the well-known
beggar-thy-neighbour policy. The unimpressive Dutch export performance,
however, seems to imply the absence of such an effect. Also, the growth in private
consumption is strikingly low and that of imports is lagging even more behind.
Here the Netherlands are an outlyer indeed. It appears to be falling imports, not
spectacularly growing exports, which help to explain the remarkable long-standing
Dutch balance of payments surplus. Finally, investment was often slack,
particularly during the early 1980s but significantly also in recent years. It did not
make a marked comeback after 1983 and was a repetitive cause of concern in the
1980s, inducing the then Prime Minister to sigh ‘one can lead a horse to water but
not make it drink.’ Over the period as a whole, Dutch performance stayed behind
all other countries mentioned for all five variables considered here, except for
American GDP and German exports. The former difference seems to be of a
structural nature and holds for many European countries. The edge over German
exports, however, seems to be temporary, hinging on the period following German
unification in 1989. It was overcome in recent years. A breakdown in four sub-
periods shows that Dutch performance was pretty bad between 1979 and 1983, and
average during the rest of the 1980s. Only between 1990 and 1994, and then only
for GDP, the Netherlands were the best performer of the pack but this was not
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 Data were taken from OECD, 1DWLRQDO$FFRXQWV statistics.
systematically related to a high level of investments or exports. One can conclude
that Dutch economic results are moderate to normal and not exceptional, not even
after 1982.
Summarising, Dutch employment outcomes were rather spectacular from a
labour force point of view, as so much more people found a paid job with which they
seem to be content. The Dutch labour market certainly was drastically transformed.
At the same time the results are not too encouraging from an economic point of view
as the input of labour per head of the population has still not fully recovered from the
inroads made during the crisis of the early 1980s. However, one can also conclude in
a positive vein that, apparently, the labour market results could be achieved in spite
of mediocre economic outcomes. Evidently, there was some leeway to develop a
different set-up of the labour market without really damaging the economy.
13
3ROLFLHV
The two most important policies that have been pursued in the Netherlands over the
last decades are wage moderation and job flexibilisation. We will first put them in a
broader perspective. Then we deal with wage moderation, including its possible
relation to the above outcomes. By contrast, flexibilisation policies are more easily
identified in the next section when we turn to discussing the model. In the
Netherlands, on should note, not all policies are necessarily government measures
and particularly flexibility measures are strongly connected to the behaviour of the
social partners in the model and may serve to illustrate the workings of the model.
$VHWRISROLFLHV
Observers often identify a broad set of five types of policy as typifying the Dutch
measures. These policies have been actively pursued, supported, tolerated or
simply not obstructed by each of the three partners in the Dutch model, employers,
unions and government:
• the extensive and prolonged wage moderation,
• the flexibilisation of labour, including the general reduction of the working
week, the increase in part-time work, and the growth of flexible labour contracts in
the narrow sense of the word,
• the substantial lowering of public expenditure,
• the pegging of the Dutch guilder to the German mark,
• the policies directly aimed at lowering unemployment, including direct job
creation (e.g. “Melkert”-jobs) and specific wage subsidies (e.g. SPAK).
We will be short on the last three types. The lowering of public expenditure was
primarily realised through the wage restraint forced upon civil servants and on
employees in the subsidised sectors like education and health care (further
discussed below) and the accompanying restraint of benefits and state old-age
pensions22. Then there is the peg to the Mark. Germany is the Netherlands’ most
important trading partner for both exports and imports. There is little to say about
the peg itself, not for lack of importance but for the monotony of the historical
evolution. Since the Dutch government in 1983 decided to fix the guilder’s
exchange rate to the Mark, it has remained unaltered and now it has become part of
the Euro. The implications are more interesting. Together with wage moderation
the peg is often seen as the basis for the Dutch success as it helped to let wage
moderation have full effect on Dutch exports to Germany23. The mediocre Dutch
export performance mentioned in the previous section casts some doubts on the
effects. We can add that Dutch exports to Germany did not exactly reflect the
increasing cost advantage enjoyed by the Netherlands. Since 1979 they have
grown by +146%, lagging notably behind exports to other EU countries (+204%)
and they grew only little more than German imports in general (+131%) – after
1982 alone they grew even less than these (+71% against +74%)24. With the peg
the Netherlands forced itself to follow German anti-inflationary policies, which it
has done even more successfully than Germany itself. Average Dutch inflation fell
from 6.8 per cent over 1970-1983 to 1.6 over 1984-1997 compared to a German
decline from 5.1 to 2.6 per cent25.
Active unemployment policies will be left aside in this paper. They
became quantitatively more important in recent years only and their effects have
been limited (see further Salverda, 1998a).
The five policies are mentioned as a matter of fact and do not necessarily
constitute a coherent package. Naturally, they may have been mutually reinforcing
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 See Hartog, 1999, for more details.
23
 In principle, also on exports in competition with Germany to other countries.
24
 CBS Website 11/6/996WDW/LQH7LMGUHHNVHQKDQGHOELQQHQ HQEXLWHQODQG and OECD,
1DWLRQDO$FFRXQWV, vol. 1, 137 (measured in value terms as , unfortunately, no
volume data are available).
25
 Between 1979 and 1997 the Dutch price level (GDP) increased by 49 %, while the EU-
US average rose by 124 %. OECD,1DWLRQDO$FFRXQWV figures. For a further discussion see
IMF (1999).
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– e.g. the peg has gone hand in hand with the limiting of government spending –
but it cannot be said DSULRUL that they were all indispensable for the result.
:DJHPRGHUDWLRQ
In the Dutch labour market there were two important developments during
the 1980s and 1990s. First, substantial wage moderation was practised as an input
for economic development including a very strong decline in the minimum wage.
Second, as we have already seen, the job structure of employment rapidly became
more flexible. We consider the former in more detail and come back to the latter in
the next section.
Figure 8 shows the considerable decline in the average real wage26 over the
first half of the 1980s. In 1984 its level was five per cent below 1979. Between 1985
and 1992 it gradually rose to a level six per cent above that of 1979. Since then it has
remained at that level, roughly speaking. The decline of the early 1980s occurred at
the top as well as the bottom of the wage distribution, which explains the above-
mentioned stability of inequality.
Government drastically lowered the statutory minimum wage. In real terms it
fell almost every year of the period and fully missed out on the recovery of the
average wage. Its real value27 fell by thirty percent between 1979 and 1996, matching
the notorious fall of the American minimum wage28. The decline was not fully
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 Hourly earnings calculated as total wages divided by total employee hours worked.
Weekly earnings, found in the earnings surveys, behaved less favourably, because of
shortening working hours. For full-time workers they fell by 11 per cent until 1985 and still
are consistently below the level of 1979. Deflated by consumer prices, which, I think, leads
to a real wage concept closest to the determinants of the behaviour of trade unions and
policymakers. If deflated by GDP-prices the evolution of wages is less unfavourable (cf.
Keese, 1999) In the Netherlands, there is a relatively large gap between consumer prices
and GDP-prices compared to other countries.
27
 Average of adult minimum wages and youth minimum wages (for each year of age below
23, starting at 30 per cent of the adult minimum wage for the age of fifteen).
28
 The Dutch level is still considerably higher than in the US, both relative to average wages
and absolute in terms of purchasing power. The youngest youth minimum wages in the
matched by the evolution of actual low earnings, partly because of the strong decline
in youth employment (which took many of the lowest paid29 out of the distribution)
and partly because the lowest wage scales negotiated between the social partners did
not always follow the lowering of the minimum wage (further discussed below).
** Figure 8 **
The disappointing evolution of the employment volume on the one hand and
the steady growth in GDP on the other imply that there has been a large increase in
productivity (GDP over hours worked30), substantially exceeding the wage trend. The
increase was comparable to that of neighbouring countries and superior to the US.
Productivity showed no dip like most of the other economic variables. Between 1979
and 1997, hourly productivity rose by 36 per cent while the real hourly wage rose
only by 6 per cent. Consequently, the wage fell by 22 per cent against productivity,
of which 17 per cent occurred between 1979 and 1985. Productivity growth
accelerated after 1983, in spite of the wage moderation. Over the period as a whole,
we can speak of a general and extended moderation of wages because the average
wage lagged so much behind productivity, and not only because of a decline in
purchasing power (Figure 8).
The modesty of Dutch employment-volume growth in itself already puts a
question mark behind the indispensability of the strong wage moderation as an input;
the rather flat performance of Dutch investments points in the same direction. A
comprehensive international comparison of wage moderation could add further
                                                                                                                                      
Netherlands, however, are much lower than the single American minimum wage which also
applies to youth.
29
 Salverda and Schonewille, 1998. This also helps to explain why Dutch earnings
inequality was so stable in spite of increased opportunities to pay low wages (cf. Salverda,
1998b).
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insights. Is the Netherlands really the champion of wage restraint? Unfortunately, the
lack of comparable data makes it rather difficult to pursue this systematically for the
same set of countries discussed so far. Actually, it can be observed that the share of
wages in GDP fell more in the Netherlands than elsewhere, particularly during the
first half of the 1980s31. This decline, however, can reflect declining employment as
well as declining wages. The most accurate data for a comparison, based on hourly
wages and productivity as shown above, can be calculated for the US, West Germany
and France only (Figure 9)32. It shows the steep decline in the Netherlands of the
early 1980s but, interestingly, the French decline appears to almost equal the Dutch
decline, on balance over the whole period. Also the German wages came close to the
French trend over the last ten years. Strikingly, all three fell much more than
American wages-after-productivity. This is an interesting observation because, as we
have seen, American employment outperformed European by far. Evidently, wage
costs are not the single dominant determinant of employment growth33. Also, other
data from Eurostat, albeit less adequate, do not exactly point in the direction of a
Dutch wage moderation far in excess of other nations. Between 1980 and 1994, real
average gross wages of male manual workers (GDP-deflated) in the Netherlands
increased by 14 per cent, holding the middle between the UK (+27%) and Belgium
(+1%), while French and German wages rose by 7 to 8 percent. Apparently, one has
to be careful not to overestimate Dutch wage moderation vis-à-vis other European
countries.
** Figure 9 **
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 Hours worked include the self-employed. Their hours were estimated by the author as
labour years worked by the self-employed times the average annual hours in a full-time
employee job.
31
 Adjusted wage share following (XURSHDQ(FRQRP\ no 65, 280. It fell from 59 to 50 % in
the Netherlands, from 56 to 50 in the European Union as a whole. In the US the share
stayed between 50 and 61%.
32
 This amounts to economy-wide unit labour costs. Naturally, the current averages are
sensitive to composition changes.
7KHµPRGHO¶
In this context, the concept of a ‘model’ lends itself to two different
interpretations:
• the institutional organisation of the economy, i.e. the structure of decision-
making, or, alternatively,
• the type of policies pursued by these institutions.
International observers usually refer to the Dutch ‘consensus’ on policies but also
seem to think that it needs a particular supporting organisation, certainly to keep
consensus going for a prolonged period of time. Therefore I define the model as
the institutional set-up of two intertwined elements: 1) the socio-economic
governance of the Dutch economy and 2) the wage bargaining in this economy (see
above and below the dotted line respectively in Figure 10). It is what Visser and
Hemerijck (1997, 12) dubbed ‘the corporatist format of the Dutch economy’. I will
present here only the essentials of the set-up and refer for further details to Visser
and Hemerijck and to Teulings and Hartog (1998).
** Figure 10 **
*RYHUQDQFHVWUXFWXUH
The thrust of the model is a tripartite and self-motivated involvement of unions,
employers’ organisations and government in an institutional structure with
relatively little antagonism between the three sides. The structure is amazingly
steady. Essentially, it dates back to the post-war years and has continued without
noticeable change during the 1980s and 1990s. This already illustrates that the
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 Keese (1999) comes to the same conclusion using a comparable approach for a set of 18
OECD countries.
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structure in itself is not a guarantee of little antagonism. During the 1970s there
was much more conflict between unions and employers than today, or as Freeman
(1998, 14) observes “The Netherlands … has moved from disease to success,
without changing its system of wage-determination or unionisation”. The structure
may facilitate reaching consensus if sought but does not produce it automatically.
Once consensus is reached, however, it can act very swiftly to change behaviour
economy-wide. One may better regard the structure as reflecting the generally low
levels of antagonism in Dutch labour relations. The incidence of strikes is low.
There may be an important relation also between this lack of antagonism and the
nature of the political system of equal representation. No single party attracts more
than one-third of all voters or gets more than one-third of the seats in Parliament.
Dutch government always runs on coalitions of different parties and there is a
permanent need for compromise. Compromise itself, however, seems less
important than the fact that, as a result, the government may, in the long run, be a
more reliable partner for negotiations than in many other countries. In more
polarised political systems where two major parties alternate, views on the
economy may differ more strongly and, after elections a winner-takes-all attitude
may encourage the winning party to dismantle the accomplishments of its
predecessor.
At the top of Dutch corporatism there is the government on the one hand,
and employers and unions on the other (Figure 10, upper half). The fact that Dutch
employers are relatively well organised, making them a relatively reliable partner
too, is another major contribution to the model. The two main trade union
confederations, FNV and CNV, and the employers’ confederation VNO-NCW are
the major representatives of the social partners. Together the social partners meet
in the Labour Foundation, which they established in 1945. Here they discuss any
issue that they agree to address, ranging for example from stimulating part-time
work to preventing racial discrimination in the labour market. The social partners
also meet with each other as well as with independent, government-appointed
experts in the Social and Economic Council. In addition, a government delegation
comprising the relevant ministers and the Prime Minister meets twice a year, in the
so-called Spring and Autumn Meetings, with the Labour Foundation to discuss the
claims and outcomes of collective bargaining and relevant policy measures. The
government also seeks the formal advice of the Social and Economic Council on
many issues relevant to socio-economic policy making, particularly including
social security. These can be of a very general nature, such as European
integration, or rather detailed, for example the increase of the minimum wage. The
Council also heads a range of corporatist institutions at the industry level which
play a regulatory rule, including the setting of wages in various branches in the
absence of collective agreements.
Formally, the role of the Foundation and the Council, and of the social
partner organisations behind them, is rather limited. They agree (or not) on
recommendations to government and to the individual unions and employers who
are the independent contractors in collective bargaining. However, before doing so
the top-level institutions – nowadays more than before – consult their supporters
and thus manage to exert a strong influence in practice. An important illustration
of the workings of the system is offered by the agreement that was reached between
the unions and the employers in the Labour Foundation in March 1996 in the
0HPRUDQGXPRQ)OH[LELOLW\DQG6HFXULW\. It was a trade-off between the application
of flexible work in enterprise on the one hand and the flexible workers’ entitlements
of social security on the other. ‘)OH[LFXULW\’ is the magic word. It led to a detailed
proposal for legislation, which was accepted by the government and led to new
legislation that has been applicable since 1 January 1999. Interestingly, industry-level
negotiations were part and parcel of the central agreement. In the sector of temporary
work agencies, which is a fully developed industry in the Netherlands, an agreement
was simultaneously reached to improve the legal position of temporary workers,
which enabled the unions to agree with increasing flexibility in the central
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agreement. Both sides made concessions. On the one hand, the maximum duration of
stay of a temporary worker on the same job was abolished, and, on the other, a
dismissal procedure remained, in a simplified and shortened version. Behind the
agreement was a changing view on the role of the temp agencies, not in the least
among these agencies themselves. For example, in the biscuit industry (11,000
employees), an agreement was concluded at the time which set an example for other
industries. Facing major reorganisations, employers agreed with a union proposal to
involve one of the major agencies. The agency hired as ordinary employees, that is
not as temporary workers, the people that become redundant in the industry and
attempted to find them a suitable employment, preferably in the biscuit industry.
Now )OH[LFXULW\ may be the smoothest and most important example, but it
should be perceived against the background of drastic changes set in motion in the
early 1990s by the preceding government. This changed social security rather
drastically, ousting the social partners from its organisation structure. They were
evicted from the boards of the social security funds, which determine the
enforcement of social security regulations and advise the government about the level
of social insurance contributions to be paid from the wage. The social partners’
behaviour was considered as part of the problem of the high incidence of social
benefits and concomitant expenditures. Being actors in company-level
reorganisations they were perceived as passing on their problems to the general
public. Presumably, they sent redundant workers into disability instead of
unemployment because of the much better benefit entitlements. The unlimited
duration of disability benefits, however, would prevent an improvement of
employment prospects from bringing about a lower incidence of benefits related to
unemployment. Although significant in itself, the change in the institutional set-up of
social security was of secondary importance for the governance structure of the
economy and the labour market.
With the start of the new 1994 government, the labour-liberal (‘violet’)
coalition, the existing political pressure risked to spill over into the very playing field
of the unions and the employers themselves: collective wage bargaining. There was a
serious political threat from the government to abolish the mandatory extension of
collective agreements. Such extension compels the enterprises from the same trades,
who are not a member of the negotiating, industry-level organisations, to pay the
same wages. This prevents wage underbidding. The mandatory extension is a purely
formal prerogative of the Minister of Social Affairs, which however, in 1994,
threatened to get real leverage. It shown in the lower left-hand corner of Figure 10.
These pressures have certainly stimulated employers and unions to decide about their
own ideas, reach as much of a consensus as possible between themselves and
subsequently try and convince the government coalition. To get away with it, they
had to promise to include so-called ‘good causes’ in their collective agreements.
These comprise training for workers and employment programmes for vulnerable
groups (financed at the expense of the wage increase), and particularly the (re-
)introduction of wage scales with lower levels of pay which are closer to the
statutory minimum wage. The achievements of the collective agreements were
systematically discussed by government and the social partners at the Spring and
Autumn Meetings. After some time, the results were considered sufficient for
removing the political threat. Paradoxically, these pressures have considerably
increased the influence of the social partners on policymaking as was illustrated by
the )OH[LFXULW\ deal.
:DJHEDUJDLQLQJ
The second part of the institutional set-up regards the specific rules governing
collective bargaining (see lower half of Figure 10). Some ten years ago the Dutch
bargaining structure was supposed to combine the worst of two worlds. Wage
bargaining should be either conducted at the national level or fully decentralised to
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individual enterprise, ‘Sweden or the US’ so to speak34. In a fully centralised
system all effects external to incumbent workers or insiders, such as
unemployment, would be taken into account through negotiations. In an entirely
decentralised system, labour market competition between enterprises would
prevent any rent seeking. By contrast, industry level negotiations, which are
predominant in the Netherlands, would allow insiders to seek wage increases
above the level of competitive wages causing sub-optimal employment. In the
economists’ debate, however, it’s now dawning that, contrary to these
expectations, the decentralised American way of wage bargaining may allow
substantial rent-seeking through large inter-industry wage differentials (not
necessarily union differentials). By contrast, European corporatism often appears
to lead to much smaller non-competitive wage differentials, that is to outcomes
which are more in line with the basic premises of mainstream economic theory. In
the Netherlands, as in various other European countries, inter-industry wage
differentials are very small compared to the US35. See Teulings and Hartog for an
important new contribution to this debate36.
To this can be added that in Dutch collective bargaining there appear to be
very few rules. Employers are free to accept any union that presents itself as a
partner for negotiations, and conversely any union is free to present itself as such
without first having to comply with eligibility rules through elections etc.. In
addition, a wage bargain struck between an employer and any one union is binding
for all other unions. Finally, wages apply to all workers in the enterprise
irrespective of their union membership. Confederations have no formal role in the
bargaining at all. Nevertheless, they are very active co-ordinators of wage demands
and offers respectively. This generates an in-built tendency towards wage
moderation to prevent them from loosing their positions. Through the combined
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 Cf. the hump-shaped curve of Calmfors and Driffill, 1988.
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 E.g. Salverda, 1998b.
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 See also Freeman, Hartog and Teulings, 1996, and Hartog, 1999. Many of the details of
Dutch wage bargaining presented in this paper, and more, are found in these publications.
set-up of governance and bargaining, Dutch unions manage to negotiate wages for
the greater part of the economy in spite of the relatively low union density. Union
membership is about a quarter of the labour force while collective agreements are
covering three quarters.
It should be noted that the experience of the 1980s and 1990s is that,
although the national social partner organisations deal with a broad range of
economic issues, their actual influence is heavily focussed on wage formation.
Little success has been booked for the above ‘good causes’, and a host of other
recommendations hardly ever reached the negotiations between individual unions
and employers37. With respect to wage formation, however, as we will see, their
behaviour can be rather effective, much more than corporatist structures are
typically thought to be able to act.
7KHPRGHODQGWKHSROLFLHV
We have seen that the employment results of the Dutch model seem to be less
outstanding than is often assumed in spite of the rather substantial wage
moderation. Indeed, employment-volume growth was very modest and SULPDIDFLH
evidence that moderation was the single driving force behind this growth is
lacking. Wage moderation and flexibilisation were the main inputs from the side of
labour but how far were they indeed an accomplishment of the model? In other
words, to what extent can their evolution be linked to Dutch socio-economic
governance and wage bargaining?
The evolution of actual earnings is not immediately connected to the
model itself but one step away from it. The bridging link are the wage rates which
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 Compare Van Heertum-Lemmen and Wilthagen, 1996, and Salverda and Beukema, 1996-
97.
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result directly from the collective wage bargaining between employers and unions.
These rates, in turn, are the point of departure for individual wage formation in
enterprise, between the employer and the individual worker. Nevertheless, the
rates are particularly important for the increase of earnings over time also for the
individual38. We find a decline in the rates (Figure 11) that largely parallels that of
actual earnings39. It is important, however, to have a closer look at the early 1980s.
In November 1982, the famous :DVVHQDDU$FFRUG was concluded which is usually
given all the credits for wage moderation. The agreement was reached between the
social partners under the threat of wage intervention by government. It comprised a
trade off between, on the one hand, wage moderation, aimed at increasing
profitability, and, on the other hand, a general shortening of the full-time working
week from 40 to 38 hours, aimed at lowering unemployment by a redistribution of
paid work. The credits given to the Accord conflict with the fact that both wage
rates and actual earnings had already been falling considerably in real terms before
that time. ‘:DVVHQDDU’ is supposed to have put an end to the automatic price-
indexation of wages but evidently this had already happened in 1980.
** Figure 11 **
It is also important to note that the factual decline after 1982 primarily
concerned government wage rates (also indicated in the figure). Civil servants’
rates lost an amazing 25 per cent of their purchasing power between 1979 and
1985. Up to 1979 the evolution of private and public rates had been almost
identical. After 1979, however, government rates underwent the same nominal
lowering and prolonged freeze as the minimum wage40. Naturally, this enabled
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 Two-thirds of all workers who stay with the same employer, have wage increases
identical to what is collectively contracted (Teulings and Hartog, 1998, 272).
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 Wage rates in Figure 9 regard weekly and monthly wages and should be compared with
the less unfavourable evolution of hourly earnings mentioned in footnote 26.
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 This also helps to explain the stability of wage inequality as many civil servants are found
at the upper end of the wage distribution.
lowering public expenditure and, through taxation, gross wage costs. By contrast,
rates in the private sector had most of their decrease in purchasing power already
behind them in 1983. Between 1979 and 1982 they fell by 5.4 per cent, the
subsequent decline in 1984 and 1985 was only 3.4 per cent and after 1985 they
tended to increase. In a similar fashion, youth rates fell drastically while adult rates
lost only very little. Basically, the wage restraint practised for adult workers in
private enterprise since 1983 was not a decline in purchasing power but a strong
lagging behind the increase in productivity. It appears that the 1982 Accord
deserves less credit for starting the wage moderation than for continuing it, and for
continuing it primarily for specific categories of workers. There was a renewed
wage moderation in the 1990s, towards the end of the period. This time the model
deserves more credit as the instigator (Figure 12). In 1992 and 1993 employer and
union confederations agreed on two recommendations, called ‘%UHDWKLQJ 6SDFH’
and ‘1HZ &RXUVH’. These advocated that unions and employers restrain wage
increases in the new collective agreements. The effect was immediate and also
affected the work force more equally than had been the case after 1982, as
government rates and youth rates evolved in much the same fashion as the rest.
Also, the timing was much faster in relation to the risks of increasing
unemployment than in the early 1980s.
** Figure 12 **
A particular element of wage formation that has received much attention in
the political debate in the Netherlands, is the extent to which the social partners in
their wage negotiations have endorsed the lowering of the statutory minimum
wage by government. Pure minimum wage employment has been declining almost
continuously and the government blamed this on the behaviour of the social
partners. Presumably, they had put the lowest wage scales well above the
minimum wage creating a gap that prevented applying the statutory minimum. The
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famous example cited was a 20-per cent gap in the building trade. However, many
industries, including the building trade, never paid wages close to the minimum.
By contrast, the collective agreements in the retail trade and similar industries that
used to apply the minimum wage as a starting wage already before its lowering,
did faithfully copy the decrease of 1984 and the subsequent freeze into their
collective agreements until the end of the 1980s41. Although since then these
particular rates have increased relative to the minimum (+ 8% in 1996), they have
lagged even further behind average wage growth (-9%). Under pressure of the
government – the above threat to abolish the mandatory extension of collective
agreements – the social partners have slowly put the minimum scales closer to the
minimum wage in recent years, also in industries where it is irrelevant. It is
difficult to establish the employment effect of this. First, minimum wage statistics
changed in 1995, so any comparison over time must be limited to the years starting
in 1995. We find an increase of the share of people earning exactly the minimum
wage in 1996 compared to 1995 (4.7 → 5.3%) but also a lowering in 1997 (to
5.1%)42. In the band just above the minimum wage, workers earning up to 110% of
the minimum wage, the employment share is constant. This conflicts with other
evidence showing that in this adjacent band the lowering effects on wage scales in
collective agreements were strongest43. The inquiry is also complicated by the fact
that in 1996 also a widely used subsidy on low wages (SPAK) was introduced44.
It was shown in the previous section that the model also promoted
flexibilisation in the labour market. First, the TXLGSURTXR for the unions in the
:DVVHQDDU$FFRUG, in exchange for wage moderation, was a shortening of the full-
time working week, generally from 40 to 38 hours. This was endorsed economy-
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 Cf. CBS, Sociaal-economische Maandstatistiek 1999/2, 31 ff.
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 Author’s calculation on data concerning collective agreements by level of lowest wage
scale, weighted by the number of employees covered by the agreement. (data kindly
provided by SZW, Arbeidsinspectie).
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 Cf. Mühlau and Salverda, 1998.
wide, often by increasing holiday entitlements. In the 1990s there was a new union
attempt to drive the working week down, now to 36 hours. This time the
implementation was much more a piecemeal process, and is still not fully realised,
and then only in exchange for an increased flexibilisation of the full-time working
week over (parts of) the year to facilitate the adaptation of labour efforts to the
demands of production. By implication, the definitions of overtime hours and pay
have become less strict.
Secondly, part-time work was encouraged, first in a government
memorandum of 1987, which was later followed by a social partner
recommendation in 1989. The stimulus was more a matter of attitudes – adapting
the labour process – than of pay, the part-time differential already being relatively
small. The legal position of part-time workers was improved on various occasions.
Since 1993 those on very small jobs (of less than about 13 hours a week) have also
been entitled to receive (an equivalent part of) the statutory minimum wage while
before they were not covered. In addition, any discrimination by length of the
working week, for pension rights etc., has been formally banned. Also, there has
been a long political debate about giving employees the right to change their job
from full-time into part-time with the same employer, within certain limits. The
idea behind this, based on surveys, is that many full-time workers would prefer to
work part-time and thus more jobs could be created. So far attempts to adopt a bill
have failed but before long some rules will be enacted.
Thirdly, attention was paid to the position of workers on flexible jobs in
the narrow sense of the word, such as temporary work, on-call contracts etc.. On
this we already discussed the March 1996 )OH[LFXULW\ deal of the social partners –
which, by the way, only became affective as of 1 January 1999. As we have seen, a
large increase in this type of jobs had already realised been between 1993 and
1996, before the time of the deal. In the year after the deal, 1997, flexible work
grew relatively little. So, again, we do not find much of an independent stimulating
effect on employment growth of the actions undertaken by the ‘model’. They
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sanctioned a change that was well under way. To this it should be added that the
growth of both part-time and flexible jobs was equally rapid before and after the
year 1982 and showed no particular effect of the :DVVHQDDU$FFRUG.
$Q\OHVVRQV"
After a synopsis of the results found above, I will tentatively evaluate the
possibilities to reproduce the performance of the Dutch model in other countries or
to sustain it in the Netherlands itself. It remains tentative not only because various
pieces of the Dutch puzzle are still missing but also because it depends on the
circumstances elsewhere, which necessarily are outside the scope of the paper.
Summarising the above findings, we can state that:
• the economic accomplishments of the Netherlands (per capita growth in GDP,
investment and exports) since 1979 have not been outstanding compared to
other countries,
• imports and consumption have significantly lagged behind other countries,
• the growth in the number of people with a paid job has been spectacular,
• but it was fully concentrated in part-time and flexible jobs,
• and the employment volume (number of hours worked) has declined (per capita)
and developed in line with that of several other countries,
• there was little direct stimulus from the ‘Dutch model’ on the growth of part-time
and flexible jobs; once under way, it was sanctioned and supported with an
improvement of entitlements and legal status,
• the decline in unemployment did not equally benefit the vulnerable groups in the
labour market,
• wage moderation in terms of real income has been considerable and prolonged,
particularly compared to productivity growth,
• wage moderation in private enterprise before the 1982 :DVVHQDDU$FFRUG of the
social partners was more important than thereafter,
• wage moderation in the public sector after the Accord was substantially more
important than in the private sector,
• initial wage moderation was large in the Netherlands, during the first half of the
1980s, but there is reason to doubt whether, on balance between the 1970s and
the 1990s, it significantly exceeded that of other European countries
Clearly, there are pros and cons in this evolution. First and foremost, the
redistribution of paid jobs has worked amazingly well. Even if it did not help to
increase the total volume of employment available it helped many more persons to
find a job. What objections could one raise to having a “part-time economy”
(Freeman) and still realise normal economic growth? (apart from the possible
increased stress of producing more in less time) It illustrates that even in a very
open economy with average economic growth the structure of employment can be
changed rather drastically to better suit the preferences of a large part of the labour
supply.
It should be realised, however, that the redistribution was effected in a
specific way. Part-time and flexible employment increased but these types of
employment primarily suit the needs of two particular groups in the labour market:
women, who seek to provide a second income in the household, and youths, who
aim to combine some paid work with their prolonged stay in education. The
compensation offered by a second income implies that the wage moderation for
households was less than for individual workers (which may explain the lack of
resistance to the moderation). Youths in the Netherlands earn a very low wage by
international standards and have continuously increased their stayed in education.
Given that situation, flexible work appears to suit their needs. The increased level
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of flexible work may be well adapted to the much higher participation in higher
education of the present and the future and in that sense it is also a positive
achievement. The other side of the coin, however, appears to be the continuing
plight of the unskilled, or people from ethnic minorities for that matter, who do
need a full-time job to earn a living instead of part-time of flexible employment.
In exchange for the employment result, and also to restore profitability,
labour has strongly mitigated its wage demands. The relation of the pace of wage
restraint to the ‘model’ appeared to be only partial. Wage restraint was also
practised for more than fifteen years after the war. During much of the 1960s and
1970s, wages rose strongly with the very same model in place. However, the
question should be asked whether the employment results really hinge upon a
moderation of such large magnitude. In spite of the extensive moderation the
Dutch investment and employment performance was not significantly better than
elsewhere. Could moderation not have been less for the same employment effect?
It did not really help to foster export growth any better than elsewhere. Perhaps
part of the effects was eaten away by a stronger currency, that is by the effective
revaluation of the Dutch guilder? Was it really necessary for redistributing the
shrunken volume of employment to more workers? The growth of the two vehicles
of redistribution, part-time and flexible jobs, did not change its pace under the
influence of the wage moderation of the 1980s.
There may again be another side of the coin, in that the protracted
moderation may even have had negative effects on employment growth. The
present and future employment growth appears to occur mainly in services,
including (low-paid) consumer-oriented services. In the Netherlands, the demand
for these services may, however, have been restrained by the internationally
exceptional decline in Dutch consumption, which seems to have come along with
the decline in real wages. The role of consumption for employment growth
receives amazingly little attention in the debate. It may be a major driving force
behind recent Dutch employment growth. Lately, the possible effects on economic
growth of the increased consumption caused by the considerable wealth effects of
the rapidly increasing housing prices (+ 50% 1993-98) alone were estimated at 3.5
per cent over recent years45.
It is tempting to conclude that the main lesson from the Dutch experience
is that a strong growth in the number of employed persons can be realised,
particularly by stimulating part-time work. Part-time work seems to be fitting the
future structure of employment, of steadily declining manufacturing and increasing
services, quite satisfactorily. A very rapid growth in the number of employed
women was realised (+ 63%, employees only). In terms of hours worked, the
increase was substantially less (+ 33%, +17% per capita) but still considerable. It
is, however, very important to realise that the change came about in the
Netherlands starting from one of the lowest levels of female labour market
participation in the industrial world. At present, the level of participation among
Dutch prime-age women is above the EU average. This may have important
implications for the future growth of part-time jobs in the Netherlands itself. In
recent years, the growth in the employment share of regular part-time jobs (non-
flexible) has come to a standstill among both sexes. Increasingly, part-time
workers may prefer to work longer hours. The extent to which this can be realised
will depend on the possibilities to open up other industries for part-time jobs. Here
the future will decide whether the explosive growth of part-time jobs during recent
decades is more than the modern form of low Dutch labour force participation, this
time expressed in terms of hours worked rather than persons on a job.
This brings us to a question not yet asked which is important for imitating
the Dutch labour market transformation in other countries. The absence of a strong
connection between the Dutch evolution and the Dutch model, to which we
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concluded before, would in itself facilitate the copying. However, labour supply
may act as a constraint for two interrelated reasons. First, in the Netherlands, the
high incidence of part-time and flexible work seems to correspond to personal
preferences but these may be lacking elsewhere. Secondly, even if the preferences
are similar, the transformation may be well-nigh impossible in countries which
already have comparable or higher levels of participation than the Netherlands,
such as Denmark, Germany, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. They would risk to turn full-time jobs into part-time, which would lower
economic growth and household income. Figure 13 illustrates that although Dutch
headcount employment has overtaken the European level, volume-count
employment is still lagging behind, in spite of significant growth.
** Figure 13 **
Summing up, it seems that there is not much more to the model’s
unemployment performance than its particular labour market set-up of a great
many part-time jobs, many of which are very small. The country has lowered
unemployment to remarkably low levels through the creation of part-time jobs, and
it has enabled a sharp increased in the presence of women in the labour market and
a significantly increased overlap between education and paid labour. There is little
objection to all this as long as people are happy with it. For the sake of discussion,
I have been rather critical of the economic rationale of the transformation.
Socially, however, it may make much more sense. Especially given the situation of
very low female labour force participation which the Netherlands still had twenty
years ago. It is difficult to say, however, how the same changes will work out in a
setting where female participation is much higher and there is no demographic
decline in the youth population. When female participation is already high,
earnings compensation at the household level will be more difficult. On the other
hand, if it would turn out that the strong lowering of wages was largely redundant
for the employment redistribution, the Dutch example might be easier to imitate. In
that case, the backing by a model geared to consensus might also be dispensable.
This, finally, might be a relief as ‘models’ rapidly go in and out of fashion, e.g. the
Swedish, the American, the Austrian, or even the German for some time
(vocational training). It would be a relief because scientific observers increasingly
come to the conclusion that one cannot simply single out an institution, let alone
an entire institutional structure, and successfully copy this elsewhere. The copying
of policies may, however, be more successful.
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7DEOH3DUWWLPHZRUNWHPSRUDU\ZRUNDQGDYHUDJHZRUNLQJWLPH
(PSOR\PHQWVKDUH (PSOR\PHQW
5DWH
7RWDO$YHUDJH
:RUNLQJ7LPH
7RWDO

0HQ

:RPHQ



+RXUVZHHN

Netherlands part-time
temporary
38.4
11.4
(31.0) 16.7
8.8
(11.5) 68.1
14.9
(61.4) 68.1 (60.7) 26.3 (27.9)
France part-time
temporary
17.6
13.0
(16.1) 5.6
12.1
(5.1) 31.6
14.2
(29.3) 59.7 (58.6) 29.2 (31.4)
Germany part-time
temporary
17.6
11.6
(17.9) 3.7
11.4
(7.1) 35.2
11.9
(30.3) 64.3 (61.8) 29.2 (30.2)
United
Kingdom
part-time
temporary
25.3
7.3
(20.7) 8.3
6.4
(6.0) 44.1
8.3
(38.3) 70.8 (66.6)  32.7 (33.4)
European
Union
part-time
temporary
17.7
12.1
(14.8) 5.5
11.5
(4.1) 33.1
13.0
(28.9) 61.0 (58.9) n.a.
United
States
part-time#
temporary
15.7 8.3 19.5 73.5 37.8 (37.8)
* including probationary period; ** between brackets: per cent point share excluding very small jobs of 10
hours or less per week; *** actual average annual hours worked divided by 52 weeks, 1997 figures,
between brackets including self-employed. # defined as usually working less than 30 hours/week.
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey 1997, Tables 51, 64 and 78, and OECD, (PSOR\PHQW2XWORRN
, Tables B, E and F for USA and working time (Dutch hours including self-employed kindly
provided by Mark Keese)
37
7DEOH:DJHLQHTXDOLW\DQGORZZDJHHPSOR\PHQW
:DJH LQHTXDOLW\ UDWLR RI QLQWK WR ILUVW
GHFLOH
/RZZDJHHPSOR\PHQW
HDUQLQJOHVVWKDQWZRWKLUGVRIWKH
PHGLDQZDJH
    
Netherlands *2.47 2.51 2.61 2.59 11.9
France 3.24 3.12 3.28 3.28 **13.3
Germany 2.62 2.46 ***2.31 13.3
United Kingdom 2.79 3.06 3.28 3.31 **19.6
United States *3.73 *3.87 *4.04 4.35 25.0
* author’s estimate on the basis of same tabulated data as used by OECD; ** 1995; *** 1993
OECD, (PSOR\PHQW2XWORRN, Tables 3.1 and 3.2
7DEOH$7KH’XWFKODERXUPDUNHW
WRWDO PHQ ZRPHQ \RXWK

QXPEHUV[
15-64 10563 5354 5209 1913
inactive but desiring work and able to start soon 339 112 227 54
labour force incl. jobs <12hrs/wk 7632 4387 3246 1257
working <12 hrs/wk 794 244 550 379
official labour force 6838 4143 2696 878
unemployed 438 192 246 89
working 6400 3951 2450 789
 12-19 hrs 455 72 384 83
 20-34 hrs 1396 344 1052 189
 35+ hrs 4549 3535 1014 518
self-employed 757 523 233 25
employees 5644 3427 2216 764
regular 5077 3175 1902 554
flexible 566 252 314 210
unskilled job 443 249 195 97
no education 471 324 147 60
Source: CBS, Labour Force Survey 1997
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7DEOH$
7KH’XWFKHFRQRP\LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\FRPSDUHGSHUFDSLWD
LQGH[ DYHUDJHDQQXDOJURZWK

 
    
*URVV’RPHVWLF3URGXFW
1HWKHUODQGV      
Germany* 1334 1.64 0.7 2.6 1.3 1.6
Belgium 1353 1.62 1.1 2.5 1.0 2.1
United Kingdom 1371 1.72 0.5 2.9 0.5 2.8
France 1259 1.26 0.7 2.1 0.6 1.7
European Union (15) 1348 1.64 0.8 2.7 0.9 2,1
United States 1295 1.29 -0.4 2.4 0.8 2.6
3ULYDWHFRQVXPSWLRQ
1HWKHUODQGV      
Germany* 1367 1.84 0.3 2.9 2.2 1.0
Belgium 1294 1.40 0.6 2.3 1.3 1.4
United Kingdom 1518 2.27 1.3 3.9 0.4 2.8
France 1257 1.34 1.2 1.9 0.7 1.0
European Union (15) 1367 1.74 0.8 2.9 1.1 1.6
United States 1365 1.64 0.7 2.5 1.0 2.3
*URVVIL[HGFDSLWDOIRUPDWLRQ
1HWKHUODQGV      
Germany* 1268 1.54 -1.2 3.3 3.3 0.3
Belgium 1308 1.51 -5.5 7.5 0.2 2.2
United Kingdom 1376 1.81 -1.2 5.8 -2.2 2.8
France 1096 0.63 -1.6 3.8 -1.7 0.5
European Union (15) 1256 1.29 -1.4 4.3 -0.6 2.1
United States 1325 1.40 -3.5 2.3 1.4 6.9
([SRUWVRIJRRGVDQGVHUYLFHV
1HWKHUODQGV      
Germany* 1851 3.09 4.1 4.1 -0.6 7.4
Belgium 2036 4.07 2.8 4.9 3.6 5.7
United Kingdom 1953 3.61 0.4 4.4 3.9 7.6
France 1999 3.49 1.7 4.3 3.4 7.2
European Union (15) 2100 3.92 2.3 4.6 3.4 7.6
United States 2582 4.81 -1.9 7.4 5.4 11.0
,PSRUWVRIJRRGVDQGVHUYLFHV
1HWKHUODQGV      
Germany* 1809 3.09 0.4 4.5 3.0 6.2
Belgium 1773 4.68 1.5 6.3 4.3 4.9
United Kingdom 2152 4.20 1.2 6.5 1.8 6.5
France 1916 3.51 0.8 6.2 2.3 5.5
European Union (15) 2023 3.75 0.2 6.1 2.9 6.7
United States 2877 5.57 2.3 6.6 5.0 11.4
* throughout including East Germany
Source: OECD, 1DWLRQDO$FFRXQWVD0DLQ$JJUHJDWHV, Volume index numbers
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